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"Smart" Economic
Development
[Editor's note: This article is part of a series on
"Research Questions for the New Millenium."
The series aims to identify research needed to
inform employment policy in the near future.]
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:onomic development organizations
are acting smarter today, promoting "smart
parks" (wired business parks), business
accelerators, and conducting industrial clus
ter analyses. Still, academic researchers
generally believe that there is room for
improvement, and they advocate even
smarter economic development policies that
can help alleviate poverty and promote
regional productivity.
In particular, most researchers insist that
smart economic development would avoid
the blanket use of tax incentives and state
grants to lure businesses across state lines.
However, these programs remain the main
stay to most economic development efforts.
Critics of the economic development subsi
dies offered by states argue that they may
generate results that are worse than zerosum, because limited public dollars are
being used to promote non-market-based
location decisions instead of providing pub
lic goods. Practitioners argue that tax and
finance incentives are crucial as states battle
for that next plant opening.
Researchers agree that economic growth
is better than no growth and that it is associ
ated with improving conditions for econom
ically disadvantaged persons. Madden

(2000), in her study of the nation's 198
largest MSAs, found that economic
growth regardless of whether it is in the
core city or in the surrounding suburbs
reduces metropolitan poverty; "[tjherefore,
all policies designed to promote growth in
jobs are antipoverty policies" (p. 162).
Bartik (1991) found that economic growth
has long-term positive effects on wage
growth, career advancement, and unem
ployment. However, researchers are
quick to point out that the effects of eco
nomic development programs depend
upon how they are financed. If disadvan
taged households are burdened by greater
taxes or are negatively affected by cuts in
public services, economic development
could do more harm than good.
Advocates of smart economic develop
ment believe that economic development
organizations should look beyond economic
incentives and toward the following issues.

Focusing Economic Development
Incentives to Areas of High
Unemployment
Bartik suggested that since the net differ
ence between wage offers and the reserva
tion wages of area workers tends to be larger
in economically depressed areas, successful
economic development efforts will generate
greater economic benefits in these areas.
Second, development in these areas would
eliminate the spatial barriers in transporta-
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tion and employment information flows
faced by job-seeking residents.
Because companies only consider pri
vate gains and not possible social gains of
locating in brownfield or depressed areas,
the social benefits generated by the devel
opment of locally depressed areas would
probably not exist without public policy
intervention. Unfortunately, Fisher and
Peters (1998, p. 212) found that most states
do not have any clear incentives for firms to
invest in places of high unemployment.
This is changing, however; for example, the
state of Michigan has introduced tax-free
(excluding sales taxes) Renaissance Zones
for economically depressed urban and rural
areas. Moreover, as of 1995, 34 states
operated state enterprise zone programs that
offer tax and economic incentives for firms
that invest in more than 2,800 economically
distressed areas.

Enhancing Areas' Economic
Competitiveness
Porter (1990) and other regional
researchers have suggested that communi
ties should focus their economic develop
ment efforts on assisting their key industrial
clusters in becoming global competitors.
Porter argued that an area's economic suc
cess depends on the quality of its resources
and suppliers, a customer base which
demands quality products or services, and
intraregional firm rivalry.
Cluster analysis can be viewed as being
part of a larger scope of research that exam
ines the spatial factors of product develop
ment and production. For many years,
regional economists have explored the fac
tors determining an area's place in its
industries' product cycles. Some areas
appear to be better incubators of
products/services, while others are better
production sites. Researchers and practi
tioners alike are interested in promoting
regional policies that encourage
product/service development that would
enable the area to keep and maintain the
more creative edge of its core industries.
Entrepreneurship development is a key
element of this spatial approach to econom
ic development. Entrepreneurs can both
generate the spark that could result in the
area's next core cluster or (more likely) pro
mote the cluster's longevity by generating

SPRING 2001
new products, new demand, or new suppli
ers. Likewise, business technology assis
tance programs, such as the manufacturing
extension services, are efforts designed to
improve an area's productivity. The role
that universities and community colleges
take in shaping the region's place in its
industries' product cycles will surely get
more attention in the coming years.

Conducting Solid Evaluations of Current
Economic Development Efforts
State and local economic development
efforts seldom spend the time or money nec
essary to conduct reasonable evaluation
studies of their programs, because poor
results could jeopardize the effort. Yet,
without such studies it is difficult for these
organizations not to mismanage resources.

The barriers to conducting solid evaluation
studies, however, are not limited to political
intransigency alone. Classic evaluation
studies require data that are seldom avail
able. The inability to conduct a controlled
experiment, for example, forces researchers
to conduct historical studies using advanced
econometric techniques to control for selec
tion bias (a major problem in small business
and manufacturing assistance programs), to
rely on subjective survey opinion data, or to
conduct cross-section regional studies where
the "treated" community's performance is
compared with that of similar communities.
A recent development along this line is
community benchmarking, in which a com
munity measures its performance on key
factors relative to similar communities (see
Erickcek and Watts 2000).

Innovative Workforce Development Programs
The Cleveland Center for Employment Training (CET) is a nonprofit organi
zation currently offering five specialized open-entry and open-exit training programs
for occupations in high demand by local business. Local governments provide 94
percent of the program's budget, and area firms play a key role in course design and
instruction. Since 1967, the program has trained and placed 70,000 persons.
The Portland, Oregon, JobNet linked economically disadvantaged job seekers to
job openings in firms receiving economic development assistance from the Portland
Development Commission (PDC). To obtain financial assistance by the PDC, firms
were required to sign a "First Source" agreement, requiring them to consider disad
vantaged job applicants selected by the JobNet Program. These candidates were
screened and trained for entry-level positions by various training organizations that
were associated with the JobNet effort. From 1989 to 1996, JobNet placed, on aver
age, 700 disadvantaged persons into jobs. Unfortunately, the program was eliminated
due to the lack of strong local neighborhood support as the state consolidated training
programs into one-stop centers.
The Minneapolis Neighborhood Employment Network (NET) is an activity of
the mayor's office that works with 11 neighborhood affiliates to link economically
disadvantages persons to private job openings. In short, the program depends on its
job developers finding job openings, which are passed quickly to the neighborhood
affiliates who recruit and screen potential job candidates.
The Milwaukee Career Cooperative is a nonprofit, temp-to-perm employment
agency working in five inner-city neighborhoods in Milwaukee. A job developer
works to find temporary job openings that can lead to permanent employment after
no longer than a 90-day period. Candidates from the five neighborhoods, who are
screened and provided job retention training, apply for the openings. The coopera
tive receives a service fee from the employer as would a private employment agency.
The fee accounts for approximately 75 percent of the program's costs; the remainder
is covered by foundation and government sources.
,
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Integrating Workforce/Human
Development Efforts with Local
Economic Development Efforts
Local workforce development and eco
nomic development efforts tend not to work
together effectively, even though they are
striving for the same goal of improving the
employment and income opportunities of
area residents. This is unfortunate because
in a competitive, full-employment environ
ment, firms may not be able to raise wages
to attract workers and may be able to grow
only through increasing the number of area
residents who are ready to work. Businessdirected, community-based training pro
grams are now found on all levels. For
example, the various Centers of
Employment Training (CETs) sites across
the country are neighborhood-focused train
ing programs that concentrate on teaching
key skills needed by neighboring firms. On
the city level, the discontinued JobNet in
Portland, Oregon, required businesses using
city economic incentive programs to give
disadvantaged individuals a fair chance in
obtaining employment. On the state level,
several states subsidize employee training
through their community colleges.
As both academic researchers and prac
titioners look for ways to act smarter, the
following questions should be explored.
1) How can communities develop and
maintain long-term job training
programs that meet employers'
needs and break employment barri
ers for economically disadvantaged
individuals?
2) What is the economic role of smaller
metropolitan areas in the changing
global environment, as product cycles
shorten and industrial networks
become international?
3) How can programs be better evaluat
ed or, more importantly, how can
future programs be better designed so
that evaluations become a means to
"adjust the course" and not to a threat
to "pull the plug"?
Clearly, the worlds of practitioners and
researchers are different. Researchers
worry about employment displacement,
cost-benefit ratios, and selection bias in

evaluation studies, whereas practitioners
agonize about generating jobs. Still, both
sides agree that an effective economic
development program depends on commu
nities' ability to link businesses, govern
ments, and other stakeholders effectively,
and that this effort will depend upon com
munity leadership. This leads to the final
major question to be addressed in the com
ing years: how do we foster the necessary
leadership to create and support active busi
ness-education-government partnerships for
effective local workforce/economic devel
opment programs?

Suggested readings:
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Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research.
Erickcek, George A., and Brad R. Watts.
2000. The Benton Harbor Area
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at http:\\www\upjohninst.org\regional\
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Fisher, Peter S., and Alan H. Peters.
1998. Industrial Incentives: Competition
among American States and Cities.
Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research.
Madden, Janice F. 2000. Changes in
Income Inequality within U.S.
Metropolitan Areas. Kalamazoo,
Michigan: WE. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research.
Porter, Michael. 1990. The Competitive
Advantage of Nations. New York: Free
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George Erickcek is the senior regional
analyst at the W.E. Upjohn Institute.

Jean Kimmel, a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute, has accepted a position as
associate professor in the Department of
Economics at Western Michigan University,
Kalamazoo, Michigan.
Kimmel has worked at the Institute
since 1989. Before coming to the Institute,
Kimmel worked for the University of
North Carolina as a graduate student lec
turer, teaching assistant, and research assis
tant. She has also worked as a visiting
assistant professor and an adjunct associate
professor for Kalamazoo College and
Western Michigan University, respectively.
She received a B.A. degree at George
Washington University, and she went on to
receive an M.A. degree at the University of
Delaware and a Ph.D. at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1990.
Since her arrival at the Institute twelve
years ago, Kimmel has performed policyrelevant research in the areas of "moon
lighting," welfare-to-work, employmentrelated child care issues, and health and
employment behavior. She has written
several working papers for the Institute,
and her work has been published in
Canadian Public Policy, Review of
Economics and Statistics, Labour
Economics, The Journal of Monetary
Research, and American Economic
Review. She has also contributed to two
books, both of which are expected to be
published this year.
Kimmel has also lectured at numerous
conferences. Most recently she spoke on
"The Returns to Education and Basic Skills
Training for Individuals with Poor Health
or Disability" (co-authored with the
Institute's Kevin Hollenbeck) at the Allied
Social Sciences Associations annual meet
ing. She is scheduled to give a presenta
tion (co-authored with Lisa Powell) at a
May conference titled "From Welfare to
Child Care: What Happens to Infants and
Toddlers When Single Mothers Exchange
Welfare for Work?"
Kimmel will join the Department of
Economics faculty at Western Michigan
University in Fall 2001.
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Terry Thomason, Timothy P. Schmidle,
and John F. Burton, Jr.

Workers' Compensation
under Alternative
Insurance Arrangements
Fne of the most important differ
ences among state workers' compensation
programs concerns the insurance arrange
ments for providing workers' compensation
coverage. State laws prescribe workers'
compensation benefits, but these laws
assign to employers the responsibility for
providing benefits. The employers obtain
workers' compensation coverage to provide
these benefits by one of three mechanisms,
depending upon the options available in
their state. They may purchase insurance
from 1) a private insurance carrier, 2) a
competitive state workers' compensation
fund, or 3) an exclusive (monopolistic) state
workers' compensation fund. In addition,
self-insurance is available in almost every
state upon satisfying prescribed criteria.
This commingling of private (insurance car
rier) and public (state fund) approaches to
providing workers' compensation benefits
is a distinctive feature of workers' compen
sation in the United States.
Another important difference is the
degree to which workers' compensation
insurance pricing has been deregulated.
The private provision of workers' compen
sation in the United States was highly regu
lated until recently. Carriers were subject to
"pure administered pricing," under which
maximum permissible rates were largely
determined by state rating bureaus, and the
rates charged by carriers were subject to
prior approval by state insurance commis
sions. However, most states in recent years
have dismantled (to varying degrees) their
systems of regulation for workers' compen
sation insurance pricing. In fact, the dereg-

ulatory movement begun by just a few
states in the early 1980s has become so
widespread that now only a few jurisdic
tions continue to use the pure administered
pricing approach.
In our recent book, Workers'
Compensation: Benefits, Costs, and Safety
under Alternative Insurance
Arrangements (2001, W.E. Upjohn
Institute), we use a unique panel data set
of state-level data for 48 jurisdictions
between 1975 and 1995 to explore the
effects of insurance arrangements on
workplace safety, the structure of the
workers' compensation insurance market,
and the employers' cost of workers' com
pensation insurance. In addition, we
examine the trade-off between the benefit
adequacy and affordability objectives of
state workers' compensation programs
and estimate the impact that the imposi
tion of federal standards for benefit ade
quacy would have on workers' compensa
tion costs.
There is substantial debate about the rel
ative merits of public versus private provi
sion of workers' compensation insurance
and about the regulation of private-carrierprovided workers' compensation insurance.
This debate has, for the most part, centered
on questions concerning the availability and
affordability of compensation insurance,
since these two variables are relatively easy
to measure. However, questions have also
been raised regarding the "quality" of serv
ices provided to the parties to workers'
compensation. Labor advocates, for exam
ple, have been particularly concerned that
the profit motive causes insurers to unjustly

deny claims or otherwise impede the deliv
ery of benefits to workers, thus exacerbat
ing the adverse consequences of workplace
injuries or diseases.
Here, we focus on our results and con
clusions with respect to only one of the
research questions we addressed: the
impact of the deregulation of the workers'
compensation insurance market on employ
ers' costs.
Deregulation and Employer Costs
Economic theory fails to offer unam
biguous predictions about the impact of the
regulation of rates in private insurance mar
kets. In part this is because these effects
depend on the behavior of the regulatory
agency, which is driven by political rather
than economic considerations. A regula
tory body that aligns itself with employerconsumers of workers' compensation insur
ance will suppress rates below competitive
levels (at least in the short run). On the
other hand, regulators who are more
responsive to the insurance industry may
help cartelize the market, resulting in supracompetitive rates. Even those regulatory
agencies that pursue the public interest can
inadvertently engender price distortions,
due to lags in the rate-making process that
delay the price response to changes in mar
ket conditions.
Empirical study of property-casualty
insurance (principally, automobile insur
ance) has usually found that rates increased
following deregulation, a result consistent
with the hypothesis that regulators respond
to consumer interests by suppressing insur
ance prices. However, the results from
those studies examining workers' compen
sation insurance rates have been decidedly
mixed. The empirical study of rates and
deregulation is very difficult, and it is likely
that no empirical study will ever surmount
all of the problems and completely dispose
of the issue once and for all. Nevertheless,
we believe that we improve on previous
research in at least two important ways.
First, while earlier studies typically used
relatively simple measures of the regulatory
environment (often, states were categorized
solely as "regulated" or "deregulated" juris
dictions), we use a more complex charac
terization of the regulatory environment in
order to capture the actual practices of the
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state regulatory agency as well as interstate
differences in statutory regimes. We cate
gorize state insurance market regulatory
regimes as
pure administered pricing, under
which all insurers must use an identi
cal set of manual rates that a) include
an allowance for benefit payments
("loss costs") as well as loadings for
factors such as underwriting expenses,
b) were developed by a rating bureau,
and c) have been approved by the state
regulatory agency;
comprehensive deregulation, under
which rating bureaus only publish loss
costs and insurers are permitted to set
their own rates without first seeking
approval of state regulators; or
three forms of partial deregulation,
where at least one of the elements of
the pure administered pricing system
has been dismantled.
Second, because workers' compensation
insurance rates vary among employers both
within and among jurisdictions, it is diffi
cult to measure the costs of workers' com
pensation insurance actually paid by
employers. Consequently, most previous
research has relied on proxies such as the
ratio of incurred losses to premiums writ
ten. We use measures that accurately
reflect the workers' compensation insurance
costs actually paid by the average employer
in a particular state during a particular year.
Figure 1 depicts summary statistics of
rate estimates for 48 U.S. jurisdictions in
the period 1975-1995, On average, the
employers' cost of workers' compensation
insurance rose markedly over the study
period, from 0.95 percent of payroll in
1975 to 2.97 percent in 1995. The cyclical
nature of insurance pricing is also evident
from the figure. Finally, the data reveal
that interstate variation in adjusted manual
rates increased considerably between 1985
and 1990; thereafter, the variation generally
declined.
Since workers' compensation insurance
costs are affected by a variety of factors in
addition to the regulatory environment, a

Figure 1 National Average Adjusted Manual Rates ( 1 S.D.) 1975-95
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simple comparison of costs under different
regulatory regimes is inappropriate.
Consequently, we estimated multiple
regression equations predicting employers'
workers' compensation costs as a function
of the regulatory regime variables as well as
a variety of controls. These controls includ
ed the levels of cash and medical benefits,
the injury rate, and the proportion of the
workforce covered by the state workers'
compensation program, as well as state and
year dummies to control for unobserved
state- and time-invariant factors affecting
employer costs. In addition, we also
attempted to examine the interaction among
the regulatory regime, the state of the insur
ance market, and the behavior of the regula
tory agency prior to deregulation.

Empirical Results
Most forms of partial deregulation are,
on average, associated with higher employ
er costs for workers' compensation. On the
other hand, the most comprehensive form
of deregulation loss cost systems that do
not require prior approval is, on average,
associated with lower employer costs. In
addition, the impact of deregulation on
costs depends not only on the statutory
form of deregulation, but also on the behav
ior of the regulatory agency prior to deregu
lation; where the regulatory agency has
suppressed rates, deregulation is more like

ly to lead to increased costs. The behavior
of the regulatory agency is apparently relat
ed to the state of the insurance market; reg
ulatory agencies are more likely to suppress
rates during a hard market (when insurance
demand exceeds supply and prices are
increasing) than during a soft one.
Consequently, the impact of deregulation
varies over the insurance cycle.
What may we conclude from these
results? Given the contradictory findings
for partial and comprehensive deregulation,
it is difficult to draw clear inferences con
cerning the nature of regulation, i.e.,
whether regulatory agencies are more likely
to respond to employers and suppress rates
or whether they are more likely to help the
insurance industry cartelize the market.
Our inability to do so leads us to conclude
that regulators do neither, at least not con
sistently. Lags inherent in the regulatory
process may be responsible for the incon
sistent findings. However, it may also be
due to the ebb and flow of political pres
sures over the course of the insurance cycle.
As the market hardens, political pressures
from employers may force regulators to
become more concerned with the impact of
insurance rates on the state's business cli
mate, and as a result, rates are suppressed.
When the market softens once again, the
political pressures ease and, concomitantly,
regulators' concerns over the effect of

workers' compensation rates vanish and
rates are allowed to rise to competitive
(and, perhaps, supracompetitive) levels.
Insurers respond to this pattern of regu
latory behavior by increasing prices during
the soft phase of the insurance cycle, which
is easier to accomplish where the market
has been partially deregulated. Anticipating
rate suppression when the market hardens
again, insurers in partially deregulated sys
tems are likely to keep market rates higher
than the competitive level during the soft ,
phase of the cycle. In a partially deregulat
ed environment, this is facilitated by the rat
ing organization, which promulgates rates
that serve as a pricing point for insurance
carriers. This accounts for the asymmetry
between comprehensive and partial deregu
lation. Comprehensive deregulation results
in lower prices during both phases of the
insurance cycle, while insurers take advan
tage of regulatory indifference to increase
rates, during the soft phase, in anticipation
of the coming crunch when the market
hardens once again.
This interpretation of our results leads
us to conclude that a completely deregulat
ed market is a more efficient delivery sys
tem and is, therefore, preferable to either
partial deregulation or administered pricing.
The latter two alternatives seem to be asso
ciated with inefficiencies resulting from
insurer uncertainty over their ability to
respond to market changes. Furthermore,
anecdotal evidence from states such as
Rhode Island and Maine suggest that insur
ance rate regulation can sometimes have
near-catastrophic consequences for all of
the stakeholders in the workers' compensa
tion program.
Terry Thomason is director of the
Charles T. Schmidt, Jr., Labor Research
Center at the University of Rhode Island.
Timothy Schmidle is a senior research asso
ciate at the Cornell University School of
Industrial and Labor Relations. John
Burton is a professor and former dean of
the School of Management and Labor
Relations at Rutgers University.

Business Outlook is the second of the two periodicals that the W.E. Upjohn Institute
publishes quarterly, and it is now being made available on-line as part of the Upjohn
Institute Web site. Under the direction of the Institute's senior regional analyst, George
Erickcek, Business Outlook provides discussion and analysis of the economic condi
tions and business developments in west Michigan.
Each issue contains a "Viewpoint" article on a topic of current interest, summaries of
the national and regional economies, and statistics and discussion of the overall econo
my in the state of Michigan. The remainder of the issue focuses on west Michigan,
including sections on the three major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the region:
Benton Harbor, Grand Rapids/Muskegon/Holland, and Kalamazoo/Battle Creek.
In addition to featuring the most recent quarterly statistics for the region, Business
Outlook summarizes recent business activity such as mergers, plant expansions, and
plant closings. An appendix provides detailed statistics for the west Michigan MSAs
and selected national data.
Among the other features you will find on the Institute's Web site are seven Research
Hubs, topic-specific pages on which we gather links to working papers, books, technical
reports, and other information found on our site. If you're interested in Economic
Development and Local Labor Markets, Disability and Workers' Compensation,
Welfare-to-work, Unemployment Insurance, Work Arrangements, Workforce Quality:
Education and Training, or Family Labor Issues, you'll want to bookmark these pages.
Other features of our site include the full text of many Institute publications and reports,
including staff working papers, articles from Employment Research, and the first chap
ters of selected Institute books. Visit us at http://www.upjohninst.org.

Seeking Manuscripts
The Institute publishes books on subjects of importance to policymakers,
labor economists, and practitioners who study labor market problems and pro
grams to address them.
The majority of the books we publish originated from our Grant Program or
for the Institute's in-house staff of professional economists. However, we also
invite submissions of publishable book-length manuscripts and proposals for
books from outside scholars and policy analysts. These submissions will be
reviewed promptly by Institute staff, and manuscripts that appear promising will
receive external anonymous peer review.
Send your manuscript or proposal to
j

Dr. Kevin Hollenbeck
Director of Publications
W.E. Upjohn Institute
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007

New Books from the Upjohn Institute
Pay at Risk
Compensation and Employment
Risk in the United States
and Canada
John A. Turner, editor

This book investigates whether
employment and compensation risks
for U.S. and Canadian workers have
increased. The
I»,.'IW<
-am authors examine
both wage and
nonwage aspects
of compensation,
and whether work
ers in either coun
try face more jobj|fi;
"ato related risks. They
. also seek to identi
fy trends in risk bearing and whether
they differ by country. Included are
Wage and Job Risk for Workers,
John A. Turner
Risk in Employment Arrangements,
Sophie M. Korczyk
Health and Coverage at Risk, Robert
B. Friedland, Laura Summer, Sophie
M. Korczyk, and Douglas E. Hyatt
Risk Sharing through Social Security
Retirement Income Systems, John A.
Turner
Risk Bearing in Individual and
Occupational Pension Plans, James E.
Pesando and John A. Turner
Risk Shifting in Workers'
Compensation, Douglas E. Hyatt
215 pp. $36 cloth ISBN 0-88099-222-0
$19 paper ISBN 0-88099-221-2 / 2001. \

Labor, Business,
and Change in
Germany and the
United States
Kirsten S. Wever, editor

How and why nations adopt sys
temic change reveals much about their
underlying economic, societal, and
governmental
bases. Such les
sons are evident in
this new volume
that explores how
two nations with
widely divergent
political
economies
Germany and the
United States embraced change in
four contemporary settings: telecom
munications deregulation and privatiza
tion, management development sys
tems, supplier relations, and employ
ment relations.
The individual chapters explore the
tradeoffs necessitated by each country's
institutions and include comparisons of
sectoral and firm-level adjustment
processes for change. Included are
Mutual Learning with Trade-offs,
Kirsten W. Wever
Deregulation and Restructuring in
Telecommunications Services in the
United States and Germany,
Rosemary Batt and Owen Darby shire
Institutional Effects on Skill Creation
and Management Development in the
United States and Germany, David
Finegold and Brent Keltner
National Institutional Frameworks
and Innovative Industrial
Organization, Steven Casper
Perils of the High and Low Roads,
Lowell Turner, Kirsten S. Wever, and
Michael Fichter
170 pp. $35 cloth ISBN 0-88099-216-6
$17 paper ISBN 0-88099-215-8 / 2001.

Workers'
Compensation
Benefits, Costs, and Safety
under Alternative
Insurance Arrangements
Terry Thomason, Timothy P. Schmidle,
and John F, Burton, Jr.

Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton
make use of a unique data set to delve
into how insurance arrangements affect
several objectives of the workers' com
pensation (WC)
program. They
underscore the
effects of deregula
tion and other
changes in WC
insurance pricing
arrangements by
performing empiri
cal analyses that
use state-specific cost, benefit, and
injury data from 48 states for
1975^1995.
This allows them to address the
interactive relationships among the
objectives of WC systems and how var
ious public policies adopted by states
or the federal government work to
achieve them.
Several important contributions
result. For instance, the authors quanti
fy the trade-offs between adequacy and
affordability that would result from a
federal mandate requiring adequate
benefits. They also provide analysis of
the possible trade-offs in using differ
ent public policies regarding insurance
arrangements, e.g., the expected sav
ings to employers from deregulation of
private insurance carriers. Overall the
authors' results clarify the complicated
relationships between insurance
arrangements and employers' costs, and
the impact of regulation on employers'
costs, WC insurance market structure,
and workplace health and safety.
457 pp. $45 cloth ISBN 0-88099-218-2
$27 paper ISBN 0-88099-217-4 / 2001.

ORDER FORM
Qty Cloth

Qty Paper

Total Price

To order a publication or request a catalog,
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100 & up=35%
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Foreign: $4 first book, $1.50 each additional book.
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Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
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Fax (616) 343-7310
E-mail publications@we.upjohninst.org

Minus discount

Plus shipping _
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